Stephen Charnock
The Existence & Attributes of God
Vol. 2, pp. 926-931.

8. The eighth consideration, for the right understanding of this attribute [of God’s omnipotence], is: The impossibility of God’s doing some things, is no infringing of his almightiness, but rather a strengthening of it. It is granted that some things God cannot do; or rather, as Aquinas and others, it is better to say, such things cannot be done, than to say that God cannot do them—to remove all kind of imputation or reflection of weakness on God, and because the reason of the impossibility of those things is in the nature of the things themselves.

1. Some things are impossible in their own nature.

(1.) First, Some things are impossible in their own nature. [1] Such are all those things which imply a contradiction; as for a thing to be and not to be at the same time, for the sun to shine and not to shine at the same moment of time, for a creature to act and not to act at the same instant. One of those parts must be false; for if it be true that the son shines this moment, it most be false to say it doth not shine. So it is impossible that a rational creature can be without reason. It is a contradiction to be a rational creature, and yet want that which is essential to a rational creature; so it is impossible that the will of man can be compelled, because liberty is the essence of the will. While it is will, it cannot be constrained; and if it be constrained, it ceaseth to be will. God cannot at one time act as the author of the will and the destroyer of the will. It is impossible that vice and virtue, light and darkness, life and death, should be the same thing. Those things admit not of a conception in any understanding.

Some things are impossible to be done, because of the incapability of the subject; as for a creature to be made infinite, independent, to preserve itself without the divine concourse and assistance. So a brute cannot be taken into communion with God, and to everlasting spiritual blessedness, because the nature of a brute is incapable of such an elevation. A rational creature only can understand and relish spiritual delights, and is capable to enjoy God and have communion with him. Indeed, God may change the nature of a brute, and bestow such faculties of understanding and will upon it as to render it capable of such a blessedness; but then it is no more a brute, but a rational creature; but while it remains a brute, the excellency of the nature of God doth not admit of communion with such a subject; so that this is not for want of power in God, but because of a deficiency in the creature. To suppose that God could make a contradiction true, is to make himself false, and to do just nothing.

2. Some things are impossible to the nature and being of God.

(2.) Some things are impossible to the nature and being of God. As to die, implies a flat repugnance to the nature of God; to be able to die, is to be able to be cashiered out of being. If God were able to deprive himself of life, he might then cease to be; he were not then a necessary, but an uncertain, contingent being, and could not be said “only to have immortality” as he is (1 Tim. 6:16). He cannot die who is life itself, and necessarily existent; he cannot grow old or decay, because he cannot be measured by time. And this is no part of weakness, but the perfection of power. His power is that whereby he remains for ever fixed in his own everlasting being; that cannot be reckoned as necessary to the omnipotence of God which all mankind count a part of weakness in themselves. God is omnipotent, because he is not impotent, and if he could die he would be impotent, not omnipotent; death is the feebleness of nature. It is undoubtedly the greatest impotence to cease to be. Who would count it a part of omnipotency to disenable himself, and sink into nothing and not being? The impossibility for God to die is not a fit article to impeach his omnipotence. This would be a strange way of arguing; a thing is not powerful because it is not feeble, and cannot cease to be powerful, for death is a cessation of all power. God is almighty in doing what he will, not in suffering what he will not. To die is not an active, but a passive, power; a defect of a power. God is of too noble a nature to perish.

Some things are impossible to that eminency of nature which he hath above all creatures; as to walk, sleep, feed, these are imperfections belonging to bodies and compound natures. If he could walk, he were not everywhere present. Motion speaks succession. If he could increase, he would not have been perfect before.

3. Some things are impossible to the glorious perfections of God.

(3.) Some things are impossible to the glorious perfections of God. God cannot do anything unbecoming his holiness and goodness, anything unworthy of himself, and against the perfections of his nature. God can do whatsoever he can will. As he doth actually do whatsoever he doth actually will, so it is possible for him to do whatsoever it is possible for him to will. He doth whatsoever he will, and can do whatsoever he can will, but he cannot do what he cannot will. He cannot will any unrighteous thing, and therefore cannot do any unrighteous thing. God cannot love sin, this is contrary to his holiness; he cannot violate his word, this is a denial of his truth; he cannot punish an innocent, this is contrary to his goodness; he cannot cherish an impenitent sinner, this is an injury to his justice; he cannot forget what is done in the world, this is a disgrace to his omniscience; he cannot deceive his creature, this is contrary to his faithfulness. None of these things can be done by him, because of the perfection of his nature. Would it not be an imperfection in God to absolve the guilty, and condemn the innocent? Is it congruous to the righteous and holy nature of God to command murder and adultery, to command men not to worship him, but to be base and unthankful? These things would be against the rules of righteousness. As when we say of a good man, he cannot rob or fight a duel, we do not mean that he wants a courage for such an act, or that he hath not a natural strength and knowledge to manage his weapon as well as another, but he hath a righteous principle strong in him which will not suffer him to do it; his will is settled against it. No power can pass into act unless applied by the will. But the will of God cannot will anything but what is worthy of him, and decent for his goodness.

[1.] The Scripture saith, it is “impossible for God to lie” (Heb. 6:13); and God “cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13), because of his faithfulness. As he cannot die, because he is life itself; as he cannot deceive, because he is goodness itself; as he cannot do an unwise action, because he is wisdom itself; so he cannot speak a false word, because he is truth itself. If he should speak anything as true, and not know it, where is his infinite knowledge and comprehensiveness of understanding? If he should speak anything as true, which he knows to be false, where is his infinite righteousness? If he should deceive any creature, there is an end of his perfection, and fidelity, and veracity. If he should be deceived himself, there is an end of his omniscience; we must then fancy him to be a deceitful God, an ignorant God, that is, no God at all. If he should lie, he would be God and no God; God upon supposition, and no God, because not the first truth. All unrighteousness is weakness, not power; it is a defection from tight reason, a deviation from moral principles and the rule of perfect action, and ariseth from a defect of goodness and power. It is a weakness, and not omnipotence, to lose goodness. God is light; it is the perfection of light not to become darkness, and a want of power in light, if it should become darkness.

His power is infinitely strong, so is his wisdom infinitely clear, and his will infinitely pure. Would it not be a part of weakness to have a disorder in himself, and these perfections shock one against another? Since all perfections are in God in the most sovereign height of perfection, nothing can be done by the infiniteness of one against the infiniteness of the other. He would then be unstable in his own perfections, and depart from the infinite rectitude of his own will, if he should do an evil action. Again, what is an argument of greater strength than to be utterly ignorant of infirmity? God is omnipotent, because he cannot do evil, and would not be omnipotent if he could. Those things would be marks of weakness, and not characters of majesty. Would you count a sweet fountain impotent, because it cannot send forth bitter streams? or the sun weak, because it cannot diffuse darkness as well as light in the air? There is an inability arising from weakness, and an ability arising from perfection. It is the perfection of angels and blessed spirits that they cannot sin; and it would be the imperfection of God if he could do evil.

[2.] Hence it follows, that it is impossible that a thing past should not be past. If we ascribe a power to God, to make a thing that is past not to be past, we do not truly ascribe power to him, but a weakness, for it is to make God to lie; as though God might not have created man, yet after he had created Adam, though he should presently have reduced Adam to his first nothing, yet it would be for ever true that Adam was created, and it would for ever be false that Adam never was created. So though God may prevent sin, yet when sin hath been committed it will always be true that sin was committed. It will never be true to say such a creature that did sin, did not sin; his sin cannot be recalled. Though God by pardon take off the guilt of Peter’s denying our Saviour, yet it will be eternally true that Peter did deny him. It is repugnant to the righteousness and truth of God, to make that which was once true to become false, and not true; that is, to make a truth to become a lie, and a lie to become a truth.

This is well argued from Hebrews 6:18, it is “impossible for God to lie.” The apostle argues that what God had promised and sworn will come to pass, and cannot but come to pass. Now if God could make a thing past not to be past, this consequence would not be good, for then he might make himself not to have promised, not to have sworn, after he hath promised and sworn. And so if there were a power to undo that which is past, there would be no foundation for faith, no certainty of revelation. It cannot be asserted, that God hath created the world, that God hath sent his Son to die, that God hath accepted his death for man. These might not be true, if it were possible that that which hath been done might be said never to have been done; so that what any may imagine to be a want of power in God is the highest perfection of God, and the greatest security to a believing creature that hath to do with God.

4. Some things are impossible to be done, because of God’s ordination.

(4.) Some things are impossible to be done, because of God’s ordination. Some things are impossible, not in their own nature, but in regard of the determined will of God. So God might have destroyed the world after Adam’s fall, but it was impossible; not that God wanted power to do it, but because he did not only decree from eternity to create the world, but did also decree to redeem the world by Jesus Christ, and erected the world in order to the manifestation of his glory in Christ: the choice of some in Christ was “before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1:4-5). Supposing that there was no hindrance in the justice of God to pardon the sin of Adam after his fall, and to execute no punishment on him, yet in regard of God’s threatening, that in the day he ate of the forbidden fruit he should die, it was impossible. So though it was possible that the cup should pass from our blessed Saviour, that is, possible in its own nature, yet it was not possible in regard of the determination of God’s will, since he had both decreed and published his will to redeem man by the passion and blood of his Son. These things God by his absolute power might have done, but upon the account of his decree they were impossible, because it is repugnant to the nature of God to be mutable. It is to deny his own wisdom which contrived them, and his own will which resolved them, not to do that which he had decreed to do. This would be a diffidence in his wisdom, and a change of his will. The impossibility of them is no result of a want of power, no mark of an imperfection, of feebleness and impotence, but the perfection of immutability and unchangeableness.

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[1] Statements like “some things are impossible in their own nature” or “God cannot contradict his own will” ought not to be understood as to derogate from his ability to perform miracles, as expressed in the Westminster Confession of Faith 5.3, “God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use of means (Isa 55:10-11; Hosea 2:21-22; Acts 27:31, 44), yet is free to work without (Job 34:10; Hosea 1:7; Mat 4:4), above (Rom 4:19-21), and against them (2 Kings 6:6; Dan 3:27), at his pleasure.” Francis Turretin raises a helpful distinction between things being impossible supernaturally vs. naturally; he elaborates:

“The impossible supernaturally is what cannot be made even by the divine power (as a sensitive stone, an irrational man). The possible supernaturally is what can take place at least divinely (as the resurrection of the dead). The naturally impossible is what cannot be done by the powers of nature and second causes, but yet can be done by supernatural power (as the creation of a world, the conception of a virgin, etc.). But the naturally possible is that which does not exceed the powers of finite nature.” (IET III.xxi.7, vol. 1, p. 245).

Turretin continues, elaborating that there is a difference between something being impossible to nature and something being impossible by nature:

“The impossible to nature with respect to second causes, i.e., which surpasses the usual and customary course of nature (as for the sun to stand still, for fire not to burn) differs from the impossible by nature, i.e., which is repugnant to the nature of a thing with respect to all causes. When it is said that the impossible does not fall under the power of God, it is understood in the second sense not in the first; for otherwise what is impossible with men is possible with God.” (IET III.xxi.8, vol. 1, p. 245).

Charnock, here, is discussing things that are impossible by nature, not things which are impossible to nature—that is, things “repugnant to the nature of a thing with respect to all causes,” and not things beyond the power of second causes, or that “exceed the powers of finite nature.” Thus, a true miracle is that which “surpasses the powers of the whole finite and created nature (such as the raising of the dead, the healing of incurable and desperate diseases, the casting out of demons, etc.)” (IET XIII.ii.19, vol. 2, p. 293), but not that which is impossible “either on the part of the thing (repugnant to its nature) or on the part of God (because he cannot do it).” (IET III.xxi.9, vol. 1, p. 245).